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EU-Africa	trade	relations:	Why	Africa	needs	the
economic	partnership	agreements
Olu	Fasan	analyses	why	economic	partnership	agreements	could	be	the	key	to	helping	African	countries	achieve
their	goal	of	industrialisation.
For	nearly	three	decades,	Europe’s	trade	relations	with	the	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	(ACP)	countries,	former
European	colonies,	were	based	on	unilateral	preferences	under	the	Lomé	Convention,	first	signed	in	1975.	However,
as	the	convention	discriminated	against	non-ACP	developing	countries,	it	was	declared	WTO-incompatible	by	a
dispute	panel	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation.	The	Cotonou	Agreement,	another	preferential	system,	replaced	the
	Lomé	Convention	in	2000,	but	established	the	framework	for	negotiating	WTO-compatible	reciprocal	trade	deals,
namely	the	Economic	Partnership	Agreements	(EPAs).	At	the	WTO	Ministerial	Conference	in	Doha	in	November
2001,	WTO	members	granted	the	EU	a	six-month	waiver	to	continue	its	preferential	treatment	of	ACP	countries	until
the	end	of	2007.	The	EPAs	had	to	be	in	place	by	1	January	2008.
However,	although	the	EPA	negotiations	were	launched	in	2000,	only	one	of	the	seven	ACP	regions,	the	Caribbean,
had	concluded	a	‘comprehensive’	EPA,	the	EU-CARIFORUM	EPA,	as	the	end-2007	deadline	approached.	But
several	ACP	countries	signed	an	“Interim	EPA”	or,	for	some	least-developed	countries	(LDCs),	switched	to	the	EU’s
“Everything	But	Arms	(EBA)”	scheme,	to	protect	their	post-waiver	exports	to	the	EU.	Some	non-LDCs,	like	Nigeria,
refused	to	conclude	an	interim	agreement	and	lost	their	preferences.	They	were	forced	to	trade	with	the	EU	under
the	less	generous	General	System	of	Preferences	(GSP).
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The	interim	and	sub-regional	EPAs	were,	however,	not	the	“endgame”.	The	EU	continued	to	negotiate	full	EPAs	with
the	remaining	six	ACP	regions	–	five	African,	one	Pacific.	By	the	end	of	2014,	all	the	regional	EPA	negotiations	had
been	concluded.	Nearly	five	years	on,	what	is	the	situation	regarding	their	implementation?
Implementation	status	of	the	African	EPAs
The	five	African	regional	EPAs	are	those	of,	respectively,	West	Africa	(ECOWAS),	Central	Africa,	Eastern	and
Southern	Africa	(ESA),	East	African	Community	(EAC)	and	Southern	African	Development	Community	(SADC).
Each	EPA	requires	the	signature	of	all	the	contracting	parties	in	each	region	before	it	can	be	ratified.	Without	the
endorsement	of	all	the	regional	parties	to	an	EPA,	it	is,	legally,	effectively	“dead”	as	it	won’t	enter	into	force.
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A	recent	European	Commission	update	shows	that	none	of	the	African	EPAs	has	been	signed	by	all	the	regional
parties	to	them.	Curiously,	instead	of	bolstering	regional	integration,	the	African	EPAs	are	creating	regional	tensions.
In	West	Africa,	Ghana,	which	has	signed	the	agreement,	is	disappointed	that	Nigeria	has	not.	Ghana’s	trade
minister,	John	Kyerematen,	recently	noted	that,	“The	agreement	would	be	frustrated	if	Nigeria	refused	to	sign”.	In	the
East	African	Community,	a	summit	to	discuss	the	EPA	was	attended	by	only	two	presidents.	Kenya	is	frustrated	that
Tanzania	and	a	few	others	are	refusing	to	sign.
So,	why	are	the	EPAs	so	controversial?	And	should	they	be?	The	visceral	opposition	of	Nigeria,	West	Africa’s
economic	powerhouse,	to	the	EU-West	Africa	EPA	makes	it	arguably	the	one	most	in	trouble	and,	therefore,	an
interesting	one	to	examine.
An	overview	of	the	EU-West	Africa	EPA
The	EU-West	Africa	EPA	negotiations	were	concluded	on	6	February	2014,	and	the	agreement	has	been	signed	by
fourteen	of	the	region’s	sixteen	countries,	except	Nigeria	and	The	Gambia.	As	the	trade	element	is	the	most
contentious,	it	is	the	focus	of	this	analysis.
EU’s	main	trade	obligations
The	EU’s	obligations	under	the	EPA	cover	tariff,	non-tariff	and	development-supporting	commitments.	On	tariffs,	the
agreement	says	that	products	“originating	in”	West	Africa	“shall	be	imported	into	the	EU	free	of	customs	duties”
(Article	10	(1)	and	Annex	B).	Although	West	Africa’s	LDCs	(13	out	of	the	16	countries)	currently	benefit	from	the	EU’s
“Everything-But-Arms”	preference	scheme,	signing	the	EPA	would	ensure	that	this	becomes	a	binding	treaty
obligation	rather	than	a	best	endeavours	commitment.	The	agreement	also	relaxes	the	usually	stringent	Rules	of
Origin,	allowing	West	African	countries	to	use	materials	sourced	from	other	countries	in	their	production	without
losing	free	access	to	the	EU.
One	of	the	main	challenges	African	countries	face	in	gaining	access	to	EU	market	is	the	EU’s	tough	quality	and
packaging	requirements.	For	instance,	in	2016,	the	EU	banned	26	Nigerian	food	products	on	health	and	safety
grounds.	However,	under	the	EPA,	the	EU	undertakes	to	provide	financial	and	technical	support	to	help	West	African
exporters	meet	its	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	(SPS)	standards	(Article	33),	potentially	removing	a	major	non-tariff
barrier.
Finally,	the	EU	undertakes	to	provide	funding	for	projects	linked	to	trade,	industry,	energy	and	transport	infrastructure
in	West	Africa,	as	well	as	funding	to	cover	the	fiscal	impact	of	implementing	the	agreement	for	the	period	of	tariff
dismantling	(Art	60	(3)).	Specifically,	it	pledged	€6.5bn	from	2015	to	2015,	and	similar	amounts	until	2035,	to	achieve
the	EPA	development	objectives.	Furthermore,	it	undertakes	to	help	West	Africa	raise	additional	funding	for	the
development	aspect	of	the	agreement	from	other	donors	(Article	54(4)).
West	Africa’s	main	trade	obligations
The	EU-West	Africa	EPA	requires	the	West	African	party	to	“reduce	and	eliminate	customs	duties”	applicable	to
certain	products	“originating	in	the	EU”	(Article	10	(2)).	However,	the	tariff	elimination	is	gradual,	to	be	completed
over	20	years,	between	2015	and	2035.		Furthermore,	only	75	per	cent	of	EU	exports	to	West	Africa	would	be
subject	to	the	zero	tariff	commitment.	In	other	words,	25	per	cent	of	West	Africa’s	tariff	lines,	classified	as	“sensitive
products”,	are	excluded	from	the	tariff	dismantling	obligation.	The	baseline	tariffs,	from	which	progressive	elimination
is	required,	reflect	the	existing	ECOWAS	Common	External	Tariffs	(CETs).	The	table	below	shows	the
implementation	stages	of	the	tariff	dismantling	West	Africa’s	obligation.
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Africa’s	criticisms	of	the	EPAs:	Are	they	justified?
Despite	the	special	and	differential	treatment	embedded	in	the	EPAs,	they	are	very	controversial	in	Africa.	The	main
criticism	is	that	the	agreements	could	lead	to	Africa	being	flooded	with	“cheap	EU	exports”,	and	losing	the	“policy
space”	for	industrialisation.	But	this	criticism	is	hardly	supported	by	the	available	evidence.
Take	the	EU-West	Africa	EPA.	Nigeria	argues	that	the	EPA	would	destroy	its	manufacturing	base	and	its	drive
towards	industrialisation.	But,	as	shown	above,	25	per	cent	of	West	Africa’s	tariff	lines,	covering	“sensitive”	locally
manufactured	products	that	currently	attract	between	20	and	35	per	cent	ECOWAS	CET,	are	not	affected	by	the
EPA’s	tariff	dismantling	obligations.	Furthermore,	according	to	a	World	Bank	study,	once	the	EU-West	Africa	EPA
has	been	fully	implemented,	it	would	only	lead	to	a	moderate	reduction	in	overall	tariff	protection	from	11.3	to	9.2	per
cent,	and	therefore	a	limited	increase	in	imports	between	0.8	and	1.8	per	cent.
The	concerns	about	“cheap	EU	exports”	and	loss	of	policy	space	should	also	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	several
responsive	provisions	in	the	EPAs.	For	instance,	the	EU-West	Africa	EPA	allows	for	a	change	in	the	West	African
tariff	commitments	to	meet	“special	development	needs,	in	particular	the	need	to	support	its	common	sectoral
policies”	(Art	12).	There	are	also	provisions	for	the	use	of	trade	remedy	instruments,	namely,	anti-dumping	and
subsidy	countervailing	measures	(Art	20)	as	well	as	safeguard	measures	(Arts	21	and	22),	the	latter	if	EU’s	exports
to	West	Africa	are	in	such	a	large	volume	as	to	“cause	or	threaten	to	cause	serious	injuries”	to	domestic	industries.	
Furthermore,	there	is	a	“fledgling”	(or	infant)	industries	clause	(Art	23)	and	a	provision	allowing	West	Africa	to	impose
trade	restrictions	when	facing	serious	balance	of	payments	and	external	financial	difficulties	(Art	89).	Of	course,	there
are	legitimate	concerns	about	whether	African	countries	can	invoke	the	flexibilities.	But	they	are,	as	they	should	be,
in	the	agreements.
Conclusion:	Africa	needs	EPA-style	deals	to	industrialise
Africa	has	a	strong	desire	to	industrialise.	And	rightly	so.	After	all,	as	Adam	Smith	said:	“No	nation	is	ever	rich	by	the
exploitation	of	the	crude	produce	of	the	soil	but	the	exportation	of	manufactures	and	services”.	But	Africa	has	major
challenges.	The	United	Nations	Industrial	Development	Organisation	(UNIDO)	calls	them	“the	3Cs”,	namely,
competitiveness	of	supply	capacity;	conformity	with	international	standards;	and	connectivity	to	markets.	If	fully
implemented,	the	EPAs	can	help	Africa	tackle,	to	a	great	extent,	these	challenges.
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Simply	put,	Africa	cannot	industrialise	without	guaranteed	export	markets;	no	country	has	ever	done	so	–	not	Britain
during	the	first	Industrial	Revolution,	not	China	today.	Even	with	its	own	Single	Market,	presumably	under	the
putative	Continental	Free	Trade	Area	(CFTA),	Africa	would	still	need	to	secure	access	to	the	markets	of	other
economic	blocs	to	become	a	major	industrial	and	trading	continent.	But,	as	Emily	Jones	puts	it	in	her	book,
Negotiating	Against	the	Odds,	“market	access	concessions	are	the	currency	of	trade	negotiations”.	In	a	reciprocal
negotiation	setting,	a	party	can’t	be	a	value-claimer	if	it’s	not	willing	to	be	a	value-creator.	Africa	complains	that	the
EPAs	would	lead	to	the	continent	being	flooded	with	“cheap	EU	exports”,	but	China	is	flooding	Africa	with	cheap
exports	without	guaranteeing	access	to	its	market	for	Africa’s	current	and	future	manufactured	exports.	The	EPAs
give	Africa	a	legally	guaranteed	access	to	EU	markets.
If	the	EPAs	fail,	Europe	would	lose	influence	in	Africa	but	Africa	risks	losing	access	to	its	traditional	European
markets,	as	well	as	the	impetus	and	support	to	tackle	its	supply-side	and	trade	constraints.	So,	Africa	should	ratify
the	EPAs,	make	use	of	their	flexibilities,	if	necessary,	and	hold	the	EU’s	feet	to	the	fire	on	the	implementation	of	the
EPA’s	development	component.
Dr	Olu	Fasan	(@olu_fasan),	a	trade	lawyer	and	political	economist,	is	a	Visiting	Fellow	at	the	London	School	of
Economics	and	a	member	of	the	International	Trade	Policy	Unit.
	
The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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